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Age differences in learning emerge from
an insufﬁcient representation of uncertainty
in older adults
Matthew R. Nassar1, Rasmus Bruckner2,3, Joshua I. Gold4, Shu-Chen Li5, Hauke R. Heekeren3 & Ben Eppinger5
Healthy aging can lead to impairments in learning that affect many laboratory and real-life
tasks. These tasks often involve the acquisition of dynamic contingencies, which requires
adjusting the rate of learning to environmental statistics. For example, learning rate should
increase when expectations are uncertain (uncertainty), outcomes are surprising (surprise)
or contingencies are more likely to change (hazard rate). In this study, we combine
computational modelling with an age-comparative behavioural study to test whether
age-related learning deﬁcits emerge from a failure to optimize learning according to the three
factors mentioned above. Our results suggest that learning deﬁcits observed in healthy older
adults are driven by a diminished capacity to represent and use uncertainty to guide learning.
These ﬁndings provide insight into age-related cognitive changes and demonstrate how
learning deﬁcits can emerge from a failure to accurately assess how much should be learned.
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T
he ability to learn new outcome contingencies declines over
the course of healthy aging in humans and animals1,2.
One proposed mechanism is age-related deﬁcits in the
ability to compute prediction errors3. However, evidence for
this hypothesis is mixed1,2,4,5. For example, learning ability and
biomarkers of prediction error signalling are diminished for older
versus younger adults in tasks that require learning probabilistic
reward contingencies from experience3,5,6. However, no such
differences are found for gambling tasks with pre-speciﬁed
reward contingencies7–12. One possible explanation for these
ﬁndings is that age-related deﬁcits in error-driven learning do not
reﬂect changes in how prediction errors are computed but rather
how they are regulated according to environmental statistics13–16.
Such regulation should, for instance, enhance learning when
contingencies are unknown (in periods of high uncertainty) but,
if anything, suppress learning when contingencies are stable and
known (low uncertainty)17.
Our goal was to test whether and how age differences in factors
that regulate error-driven learning can account for age-related
deﬁcits in adaptive behaviour18–21. We focused on three factors—
uncertainty, surprise and hazard rate—that can have distinct
effects on learning and are subserved, at least in part, by
dissociable neural mechanisms14,15,22.
Uncertainty about the state of a latent variable, such as the
underlying market value of a company whose stock price
ﬂuctuates wildly, is termed estimation uncertainty19,23. When
estimation uncertainty is high, corresponding beliefs are
unreliable, and should be revised according to new outcomes
through learning13,18,23. More precise prescriptions for the rate
of learning are provided by relative uncertainty, which describes
the contribution of estimation uncertainty to overall ignorance
about upcoming events (for example, tomorrow’s stock price).
Relative uncertainty sets the optimal learning rate in a stable
environment; thus a stock trader should be more sensitive to new
stock prices when she is less certain about the underlying value of
the company.
While uncertainty can provide a reasonable prescription for
learning during periods of relative stability, efﬁcient learning in
dynamic environments also requires online detection of abrupt
shifts in a latent state, such as might occur for a company with
the announcement of a costly settlement24. Such abrupt shifts
are referred to as change points. They render the past irrelevant
to the future, and thus require an immediate increase in learning
to discard irrelevant information13,17. While change points
cannot always be perfectly identiﬁed, the probability of such an
event can be efﬁciently estimated according to Bayes rule18,21,24.
In the Bayesian formulation, change-point probability depends
critically on the likelihood of the newest observation (today’s
stock price) given the previous data (price history). The less likely
the new observation, the more it indicates a fundamental change
in the latent state. Thus a primary determinant of change-point
probability, and consequently learning, is surprise17–19,21.
Surprise is greatest when outcomes deviate most substantially
from predictions and thus can be measured by the absolute
magnitude of prediction errors25.
The probability that a surprising observation reﬂects a
change point depends on the base rate of change points in
the environment, termed the hazard rate21. The hazard rate
acts as a prior that regularizes the number of detected
change points; thus the lower the hazard rate, the greater the
amount of surprise that is tolerated without an increase in
learning. That is to say, a moderate decrement in the stock
price of a company should be largely ignored if that company
has been historically stable, but demands rapid recalibration of
beliefs if that company has been prone to fundamental price shifts
in the past.
Despite evidence that uncertainty, surprise and hazard rate are
important mediators of learning in young adults, little is
known about how subjective representations of these quantities
affect learning across the adult lifespan. Older adults show
deﬁcits in learning tasks involving uncertainty and changes in
task contingencies6,26–32. In principle, such learning deﬁcits could
reﬂect a speciﬁc computational deﬁcit in any of the normative
learning factors listed above, but this idea has not been tested
explicitly.
Here we provide such a test, using a three-step analytic
approach. First, we used a normative model to show that
deﬁcits in processing uncertainty, surprise or hazard rate can lead
to unique and diagnosable learning deﬁcits. Second, we
collected and analysed behavioural data to identify signatures
of these different impairments and found that older adults
have a deﬁcit in representing and using uncertainty in the
service of learning. Third, we conﬁrmed this ﬁnding through
quantitative model ﬁtting and identiﬁed an additional age-related
difference: older adults tended to be more variable in their
assignments of learning rate than younger subjects. Altogether,
these ﬁndings support the idea that age-related differences in
learning reﬂect a selective impairment in the ability to represent
uncertainty rather than a general deﬁcit in the ability to learn
from prediction errors.
Results
Task design and model predictions. Younger (20–30 years;
n¼ 57) and older (56–80 years; n¼ 57) adults performed a
modiﬁed version of a predictive inference task administered as
part of a larger battery of behavioural tasks15. The task required
participants to infer the position of a virtual helicopter based
on the positions of bags that had previously fallen from it
using a form of error-driven learning (Fig. 1a). On each trial,
the participant placed a bucket under the inferred position of
the helicopter. A bag then fell from the top of the screen
and exploded to reveal contents that could be collected in
the bucket. The participant could adjust the bucket placement
for the subsequent trial in response to the indicated error between
the previous bucket placement and the subsequent bag location.
The key manipulation was the trial-by-trial bag position, which
was normally distributed around a mean determined by the
helicopter location. The mean location was stable for sequences
of trials separated by abrupt, un-signalled change points at
which the helicopter relocated to a random position. The s.d. of
the bag distribution was consistent across change points within a
block of trials but manipulated across blocks to give rise to
varying levels of noise.
Effective performance in this task, as has been demonstrated by
young adult participants in previous studies, is well described by a
normative model that uses learning rates that are dynamically
adjusted on each trial15,16,18,21,24 (Fig. 1b,c). Learning rate reﬂects
the extent to which a given error is used to update the bucket
position. A small learning rate (B0) implies that an error should
be ignored, whereas a large learning rate (B1) implies that the
error should be used in its entirety to place the bucket at the most
recent bag location.
Dynamic learning rates prescribed by the normative model
depend on two factors: change-point probability and relative
uncertainty. The ﬁrst factor, change-point probability, reﬂects the
probability that the helicopter has relocated immediately before
the most recent bag drop and can itself be dissociated into two
separate components: hazard rate and surprise. The hazard rate
reﬂects the frequency of change points, which is constant
throughout the task but likely perceived differently across subjects
(Fig. 1d, green). Surprise reﬂects the lack of correspondence
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between predictions and outcomes and varies from trial-to-trial
according to the absolute magnitude of prediction errors (Fig. 1d;
orange). Thus, trial-to-trial ﬂuctuations in change-point
probability can be thought of as a normative prescription for
surprise-driven learning.
The second factor, relative uncertainty, reﬂects the imprecision
with which helicopter position can be estimated based on
previous bag locations. Relative uncertainty is greatest after the
model has observed only a single bag drop from a new helicopter













































Figure 1 | Predictive inference task. (a) Participants were instructed to place a bucket under the most likely location of a helicopter to collect gold coins
(prediction). On each trial the helicopter dropped a bag and some of the contents from this bag fell in the bucket placed by the participant (outcome).
After bag contents were revealed and distributed (not shown) tick marks were displayed to mark the bucket and bag locations from the previous trial along
with a red line indicating the difference between these locations (prediction error). Participants then updated the position of the bucket to maximize
earnings on the subsequent trial. (b) Screen positions (ordinate) of various task events are plotted across trials (abscissa) for part of a task session.
On most trials the helicopter (black dotted line) remained in the same location as the previous trial, though occasionally it would move to a completely new
location of the screen (change point). On each trial the helicopter would drop a bag containing either gold or rocks (yellow and grey points, respectively)
that was offset from the helicopter position according to a noise function that was manipulated blockwise (vertical dotted line indicates block transition).
The participant placed the bucket on each trial according to previous bag locations (blue line). Participant bucket placements were qualitatively consistent
with a normative learning model (pink line). (c) Spatial prediction errors (bag location–bucket location) for the same example participant (blue) and model
(pink) were relatively small during periods of stability but extreme at change points. (d) Normative learning requires information about hazard rate, surprise
and uncertainty on each trial. Hazard rate (green) was constant for the entire task leading the model to rely on the surprise associated with each prediction
error to estimate trial-to-trial variability in change-point probability (orange). Likely change points lead to elevated estimates of relative uncertainty (blue)
that decay with each well-predicted observation.
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leading to learning rates that decay during periods of stability
(Fig. 1d, blue).
One important feature of our model is that it can provide
quantitative predictions of the distinct effects that
speciﬁc computational impairments have on learning (Fig. 2).
Insensitivity to surprise is characterized by a decrease in the
steepness of the function relating relative prediction error to
learning rate. Thus, surprise insensitivity would lead to a speciﬁc
reduction in learning from large errors (Fig. 2a). In contrast,
underestimation of the hazard rate increases the threshold
for surprise necessary to infer a change point, without affecting
the slope of the function. This leads to reduced learning rates
across a wide range of moderately surprising outcomes that are
less likely to be interpreted as change points if a low hazard rate is
assumed. Underestimation of uncertainty leads to reduced
learning speciﬁcally from small, unsurprising prediction errors
that are unlikely to reﬂect change points in the helicopter location
(Fig. 2c). All of these effects can also be distinguished from overall
changes in learning rate, such as those expected from decreased
prediction error magnitude (Fig. 2a–c, green).
Age-related differences in learning. To test whether learning
differences across healthy aging reﬂect one or more of these
speciﬁc computational deﬁcits, we ﬁrst analysed participant
behaviour using a regression model. The model described
learning behaviour according to principles of error-driven
learning. Speciﬁcally, the distance that participants moved the
bucket on each trial (the update) was explained using the
difference between the position of the bag and the previous
bucket position, called the prediction error (Fig. 1a). The slope of
such a linear function is equivalent to a ﬁxed learning rate in an
error-driven learning model. The regression model included
separate interaction terms that could account for learning rates
that were adjusted on each trial according to surprise, uncertainty
and hazard rate (Fig. 3a). To diagnose the computational
impairments highlighted above, we applied the regression
model in sliding windows of trial outcomes ordered from the
least to the most surprising as indexed by relative error
magnitude (see Methods section).
Learning rates described by the regression model tended to
increase with relative error magnitude, as predicted by the
normative model, but with age-related differences for relatively
small errors (Fig. 3b–d). On average, younger adults were more
inﬂuenced than older adults by small errors (permutation test for
H0: equal mean learning coefﬁcients, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.05).
This reduced sensitivity to small errors in older adults did not
reﬂect age-related differences in visual acuity. A deﬁcit in visual
acuity would have led to impairments in the processing of small
errors independently of the noise level. However, we found that
the age-related differences in behaviour were highly sensitive to
expected variability, with pronounced differences between young
and older participants for moderate spatial errors when the
variability in the bag distribution was large (high noise; Fig. 3d).
These differences in overall learning rate were accompanied by
age-related differences in how speciﬁc computational factors
governed learning. The normative model suggests that learning
should be greater during periods of uncertainty or after observing
a surprisingly large prediction error (Fig. 1d). Our regression
model captured such behaviour with interaction terms reﬂecting
the effects of uncertainty and surprise on prediction error-driven
learning. In Fig. 4 we plot the coefﬁcients for these interaction
terms for each sliding window of data sorted from least to most
surprising. Positive coefﬁcient values for these interaction terms
indicate higher learning rates on trials where trial-by-trial





























Figure 2 | Learning deﬁcits stemming from hypothetical deviations from normative behaviour. Normative learning (orange line, all panels) requires
identifying and responding appropriately to surprising outcomes while maintaining internal representations of uncertainty. While deﬁcits in learning could
emerge from a failure to fully represent prediction errors (green line, all panels), they could also emerge from a more selective deﬁcit in appropriately
choosing a learning rate such as: (a) Insensitivity to surprising outcomes, (b) Underestimation of the true base rate of change points (hazard rate) or (c)
Insufﬁcient representation of uncertainty. Such deviations from normative behaviour can all reduce the rate of learning, but do so only under a speciﬁc set
of conditions. Insensitivity to surprise should lead to learning deﬁcits most notable after surprisingly large errors (a). Underestimation of the hazard rate
should result in learning deﬁcits for moderately surprising errors (b). Reduced uncertainty should lead to selective learning impairments for the least
surprising outcomes (c).
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probability (surprise) were greater. Consistent with normative
updating, we found that both age groups learned more when
uncertainty was high, especially for intermediate relative
prediction errors (Fig. 4a; permutation test for H0: uncertainty
coefﬁcient¼ 0, n¼ 57, Po0.001 for young participants
and Po0.005 for older participants) albeit with substantial
heterogeneity across individuals (Fig. 4d). Similarly, both
groups increased learning as a function of surprise (Fig. 4b,e;
permutation test for H0: surprise coefﬁcient¼ 0, n¼ 57, Po0.001
for both groups). However, younger participants adjusted
learning according to uncertainty more than their older
counterparts (Fig. 4a,d; permutation test for H0: equal mean
uncertainty coefﬁcients, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.005). In contrast,
older participants adjusted learning more in response to surprise
than their younger counterparts (Fig. 4b, permutation test for H0:
equal mean surprise coefﬁcients, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.005).
Thus, our data show an age-related double dissociation with
respect to the factors that govern adaptive learning: older adults
show a reduced sensitivity to uncertainty but an enhanced
sensitivity to surprise than younger adults.
Behaviour on ‘catch trials’ (trials on which the helicopter was
visible) also showed age-related learning differences. Participants
could use this information as an additional cue to identify the
true mean of the helicopter location. Using additional terms in
our regression model, we found that both younger and older
participants tended to make appropriate, additional updates
towards the visible helicopter (Fig. 4c,f; permutation test for H0:
coefﬁcient¼ 0, n¼ 57, Po0.001 for both groups) and away from
the most recent bag position (Supplementary Fig. 3; permutation
test for H0: coefﬁcient¼ 0, n¼ 57, Po0.001 for both groups).
However, the groups differed in the extent to which they
updated towards the helicopter: older participants showed less
pronounced updating, particularly after the smallest errors
(Fig. 4c; permutation test for H0: equal mean helicopter update
coefﬁcients, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.05).
These learning differences between groups were reﬂective of
age rather than differences in ﬂuid intelligence or working
memory. An explanatory model that included each of the
age-related learning differences identiﬁed above (learning rate
for unsurprising outcomes, uncertainty, surprise and helicopter
updating) could explain differences in age across subjects
(F¼ 6.37, n¼ 114, Po0.001) and generated predictions that
correlated with ﬂuid intelligence, as assessed with Raven’s

















































Figure 3 | Younger participants adjusted expectations more after making relatively small errors. (a) Relative bucket updates (bucket update divided by
noise; ordinate) are plotted against signed relative error (error magnitude divided by noise; abscissa) for each trial completed by a single example subject.
Trials are divided into bins according to unsigned relative error (absolute error magnitude divided by noise; lighter colours for larger relative errors).
Consistent with normative learning, lighter points tend to be closer to the unity line (dotted diagonal) and darker points tend to deviate towards the zero
update line (dotted horizontal). (b and c) Regression coefﬁcients describing the effect of prediction errors on updates are plotted separately for older (blue)
and younger (orange) participants across all sliding window bins of unsigned relative error (b) and for a subset of smaller relative error bins (c). Signiﬁcant
differences (permutation tests for cluster mass, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.05) are marked with dark points. (d) Differences in learning depended on the
noise distribution. Learning rates predicted by the regression model for old (blue) and young (orange) participants are plotted separately for high
(dark) and low (light) standard deviation conditions across bins of spatial error magnitude. Learning differences between groups emerged for both
conditions for errors smaller than one standard deviation of the noise distribution (marked by dotted lines). In all panels, lines and shading reﬂect mean and
s.e.m. respectively.
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memory as assessed by the operation span task (r¼  0.35,
Po0.001). However, learning differences were not simply
reﬂecting aspects of ﬂuid intelligence or working memory that
co-vary with age, as the task measurements were related to age
even after accounting for these covariates (nested F¼ 3.29,
n¼ 114, P¼ 0.01).
Learning differences are simulated by reduced uncertainty. To
qualitatively assess the contribution of uncertainty under-
estimation to age-related differences in task performance, we
modiﬁed the normative model by artiﬁcially reducing its estimate
of uncertainty on each trial. We used both the normative model
and the low-uncertainty model to generate data for the task
sessions completed by our human participants and analysed the
data from these models using the same regression framework.
Furthermore, we followed the same procedure to simulate task
behaviour using two other sub-optimal models, one insensitive
to surprise and the other with under-estimated hazard rates, to
compare the simulated behaviour to our empirical results.
The low-uncertainty model, unlike the other sub-optimal
models, generated predictions that differed from those of the
normative model in a manner that mimicked four key differences
between younger and older participants. First, the low-
uncertainty model showed lower learning rates speciﬁcally after
small errors (Fig. 5a). Second, the low-uncertainty model
modulated learning less according to uncertainty (Fig. 5b). Third,
the low-uncertainty model was more sensitive to changes in
surprise, particularly after the moderately sized errors where older
and younger participants differed most (Fig. 5c). Fourth, the
low-uncertainty model was less prone to adjust expectations
towards an additional cue representing the visible helicopter,
especially in the absence of a surprisingly large prediction error
(Fig. 5d). Neither of the other two sub-optimal models could
reproduce the speciﬁc learning deﬁcit for small errors or the
double dissociation between uncertainty- and surprise-driven
learning effects.
Reduced uncertainty best describes learning in older adults. To
quantitatively test the idea that learning differences across the age
groups arise as a result of uncertainty underestimation, we ﬁt a
ﬂexible version of the normative learning model directly to
participant behaviour. This ﬂexible model contained free
parameters to describe each of the computational deﬁcits
that could impact learning rate: (1) insensitivity to surprise, (2)
mis-estimated hazard rate and (3) uncertainty underestimation.
In addition to these learning terms, the model also contained
two parameters to allow for behavioural variability: one term
that allowed for variability in update magnitude (allowing
for imprecise bucket placements) and another that allowed for
variability in learning rate (allowing for bucket precision to
decrease with error magnitude). For each subject, all parameters
were ﬁt simultaneously using maximum likelihood estimation
and best ﬁtting parameters were interpreted as quantitative
estimates of the latent factors governing learning behaviour.
Note that parameter ﬁts from this model should be viewed as
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Figure 4 | Age differences in uncertainty and surprise-driven learning. Regression coefﬁcients for interaction terms were estimated in sliding windows of
outcomes ordered from the least to the most surprising. For a–c, regression coefﬁcients are plotted on the ordinate against the median binned relative error
for each sliding window on the abscissa. (a) Uncertainty regression coefﬁcients (ordinate) for older (blue) and younger (orange) participants differed
across a range of relative errors (abscissa). (b) Surprise regression coefﬁcients (ordinate) were larger in older, relative to younger, participants for
moderately large errors (abscissa). (c) Helicopter update coefﬁcients (ordinate) show that both groups moved the bucket towards the helicopter on catch
trials (positive values), but that young participants did so more than old participants after making small relative errors (abscissa). Mean/s.e.m. coefﬁcient
values are reﬂected by line/shading and dark points indicate bins including a signiﬁcant group difference (permutation tests for cluster mass, n¼ 57 per
group, Po0.05). (d–f) Regression coefﬁcients for individual young/old participants (orange/blue points) in relative error bins with maximal group
differences (pink lines in a–c; ordinate) are plotted against learning rate coefﬁcients. Note that group coefﬁcient differences are not driven by the small
group of subjects with extremely high learning rates.
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our descriptive analysis as the parameter ﬁts provide an aggregate
measure of computational deﬁcits based on the same underlying
data used for the regression analysis above.
Parameter estimates for young and old participants conﬁrmed
age differences in uncertainty along with additional differences
(Fig. 6). Maximum likelihood estimates of the uncertainty–
underestimation parameter tended to be positive, indicating
that most participants were best ﬁt by models that failed to
represent normative levels of uncertainty (mean±s.e.m
parameter estimates were 2.69±0.23 and 1.52±0.19 for old
and young participants, respectively). Consistent with our
descriptive results, this bias towards underestimating uncertainty
was more pronounced in older participants (t¼ 3.92, n¼ 57
per group, Po0.001). In addition, we found age-related
differences in surprise sensitivity, which was higher in older
adults (mean±s.e.m. parameter estimates were 0.51±0.04 and
0.40±0.03 for young and old participants, respectively; t¼ 2.11,
n¼ 57 per group Po0.05), and learning rate variability, which
also was elevated in older adults as compared to younger adults
(t¼ 3.42, n¼ 57 per group, Po0.001). In contrast, we found no
evidence for differences in hazard rate across the two groups
(t¼ 0.21, n¼ 57 per group, P40.9).
One potential concern with using model-based parameter
estimation to infer latent computational properties is that
estimated parameters can be highly sensitive to the model in
which they are embedded. In particular, the failure of a model to
account for key sources of variability can lead to biased parameter
estimates33. To examine the robustness of our modelling results,
we constructed three additional models that progressively
relax the assumptions about subjective perceptions of noise and
in turn improved the ability of the model to account for
behaviour. The ﬁrst two models consider the possibility that
subjective perceptions of noise are scaled (model 1) or scaled and
offset (model 2) relative to the ground truth. The third model
considers the possibility that noise is itself uncertain and
predictive distributions are composed of a mixture of Gaussian
distributions, each having a different width.
Consistent with previous work suggesting variability in
perceptions of noise within and between subjects18, the most
complex model containing within and between subject variability
in noise estimates ﬁt better than all simpler models, even after
penalizing for additional parameters (Supplementary Fig. 4).
The key advantage of this complex model appears to be that it
effectively captures the shape of the relationship between
learning rate and error magnitude (Supplementary Fig. 6).
However, one disadvantage of this additional complexity is that
it leads to parameter tradeoffs that decrease the recoverability of
individual parameters, particularly the surprise sensitivity
parameter (compare Supplementary Figs 5 and 7). Consistent
with this lack of identiﬁability, surprise sensitivity did not differ
across the age groups in any of these three models (all P40.05).






























































Figure 5 | Uncertainty underestimation mimics altered behaviour in older participants. Behaviour was simulated using a normative model (orange) and
three deviant models: (1) surprise insensitivity (pink), (2) hazard rate underestimation (yellow) and (3) uncertainty underestimation (blue). Colours were
chosen to emphasize that uncertainty underestimation deviates from the normative model in the same manner that older participants deviate from younger
ones. (a) Mean/s.e.m. learning rate regression coefﬁcients (line/shading) describing the effect of the prediction errors on the subsequent updates made by
these models (see Fig. 3b). Only the uncertainty underestimation model shows a selective learning deﬁcit in these bins. (b) Mean/s.e.m. uncertainty
regression coefﬁcients (line/shading) are plotted separately for each simulated model across all relative error bins (compare with Fig. 4a) (c) Mean/s.e.m.
surprise regression coefﬁcients (line/shading) are plotted separately for each simulated model across relative error bins (compare with Fig. 4b).
(d) Mean/s.e.m. regression coefﬁcients (line/shading) describing the effects of the helicopter over simulated model updates for trials when it was
visible (for example, how much does the model adjust estimates towards the observed helicopter; compare with Fig. 4c). In all panels, dark points mark
bins with signiﬁcant differences between younger and older participants (permutation tests for cluster mass, n¼ 57 per group, all P values o0.05) and
lines/shading reﬂect mean/s.e.m. of simulated model behaviour.
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variability parameters were elevated for older relative to younger
subjects in each of the three additional models (all t43.4, all
Po0.001 for UU, all t43.1 all Po0.005 for LRV), suggesting that
age differences in uncertainty underestimation and learning rate
variability are robust to speciﬁc modelling choices.
Model estimates of uncertainty underestimation also offer a
parsimonious description of age-related changes in learning.
Subject-speciﬁc estimates of the uncertainty underestimation
parameter were correlated with each of the four learning
differences identiﬁed by our descriptive analysis (Pearson’s
r¼  0.49,  0.20, 0.46 and  0.29 for learning rate, uncertainty,
surprise and helicopter coefﬁcients, respectively; all
P values o0.05), suggesting that this metric can account for each
of the features of the data that were identiﬁed using the descriptive
model. Uncertainty underestimation ﬁts were negatively correlated
with ﬂuid intelligence (r¼  0.268, Po0.01), but not with
working memory (r¼  0.1287, P¼ 0.17). Uncertainty under-
estimation also explained variance in age even after accounting for
these potential covariates (nested F¼ 5.92, Po0.05) and
coefﬁcients relating uncertainty underestimation to age were
positive in a model that included these terms (mean±95%
conﬁdence interval: 1.59±1.28 years per unit uncertainty
underestimation). Thus uncertainty underestimation offers a
parsimonious explanation for age-related learning differences
beyond the well-documented age differences in ﬂuid abilities.
Discussion
Age-related deﬁcits in learning have previously been attributed to
differences in the computation of prediction errors3,5,6. However,
the data to support this hypothesis are somewhat contradictory
and point to a more complicated scenario34. Here we examined
one such scenario: deﬁcits in learning result from differences in
how older individuals assign inﬂuence to new information
according to environmental statistics. We identiﬁed three
plausible computational changes that could give rise to such a
learning deﬁcit: (1) insensitivity to surprise, (2) underestimation
of uncertainty and (3) underestimation of the hazard rate of
change points. To formalize these predictions, we simulated
learning behaviour in a predictive inference task using a
normative model and independently manipulated each of these
factors. We then asked younger and older adults to perform the
task and tested the model predictions empirically.
We found that older adults displayed a selective deﬁcit in
learning that is best described by reduced uncertainty. Older
adults learned less from unsurprising outcomes than their
younger counterparts, qualitatively matching the predictions
from a low-uncertainty model of learning (compare Figs 2c and
4b). Moreover, older adults, like low-uncertainty learners, relied
more heavily on surprise and less heavily on uncertainty in
adjusting learning rates (compare Figs 4a,b and 5b,c). Consistent
with the qualitative results of the regression analysis our
quantitative model ﬁtting suggests that age differences in learning
can be explained by systematic underestimation of uncertainty
by older adults (Fig. 6). Reduced uncertainty, as measured
by parameter estimates from the ﬂexible learning model, could
explain differences in age even after accounting for age-related
differences in working memory and reasoning abilities. These
results support the overarching hypothesis that changes in
learning across healthy aging result from changes in upstream
computations necessary for determining how much to learn in a
given situation. Furthermore, they suggest that age-related
deﬁcits in uncertainty-driven learning can be dissociated from a
general decline in ﬂuid abilities with age. Taken together, our data
suggest that cognitive aging reduces subjective representations of
uncertainty, which in turn diminishes learning under speciﬁc
circumstances.
In addition, older adults in our study used more variable
learning rates than their younger counterparts. This result is
consistent with previous ﬁndings of age-related increases in
behavioural variability35. Older adults also tended to have
relatively enhanced sensitivity to surprise. However, we were
unable to clearly dissociate this effect from their reduced
uncertainty estimates. If future work could conﬁrm such an
advantage, surprise sensitivity might represent a compensatory
mechanism that could be exploited in designing learning
environments that are tailored to the needs of the elderly
population.
While our results are the ﬁrst to demonstrate a failure of older
adults to recruit requisite levels of uncertainty in the service of
learning, previous work has hinted that this might be the case. For
example, recent work suggests that older adults show deﬁcits in
probabilistic compared with deterministic learning tasks6,26–29,
in situations where feedback is ambiguous30,31 and during
reversal learning27,32. Despite these deﬁcits, older adults show
similar competence to younger adults in decision tasks that
explicitly describe risks, suggesting that the deﬁcit is in learning
from probabilistic cues, rather than failing to act appropriately
according to learned values9,11,12. Our results suggest that these
age-related impairments in learning can be attributed to a speciﬁc







































Figure 6 | Age-related differences in uncertainty underestimation. Participant updating behaviour was ﬁt with a ﬂexible version of the normative model.
(a) Mean and 95% conﬁdence intervals on standardized differences (young–old) for maximum likelihood parameter estimates of: (1) uncertainty
underestimation (Unc), (2) expectations about the hazard of change points (Haz), (3) sensitivity to surprising outcomes (SS), (4) update variability (UV),
(5) learning rate variability (LRV). (b) Maximum likelihood estimates of uncertainty underestimation (ordinate) and learning rate variability (abscissa) for
young (orange squares) and old (blue circles) participants.
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deﬁcit in the ability to recruit requisite levels of uncertainty to
appropriately guide learning.
Why do older adults fail to represent sufﬁcient levels of
uncertainty? One possibility is that representing appropriate
levels of uncertainty requires a cognitive and/or biological
resource that decays across healthy aging. One obvious candidate
for such a resource is working memory capacity36. Working
memory capacity declines as a function of healthy aging and has
been identiﬁed as a potential source of age-related deﬁcits in
probabilistic learning37–39. While previous work has focused on
the role of working memory for the storage and selective recall of
action–outcome contingencies, another use for such a system
might be to store and recall plausible hypotheses about latent task
states38,40. In such a regime, decrements in working memory
capacity would lead to fewer stored hypotheses, and in the
extreme where only a single hypothesis is stored, a complete lack
of uncertainty41. However, within our study we did not ﬁnd
strong evidence for a relationship between working memory
capacity and uncertainty underestimation. Moreover, age-related
deﬁcits in uncertainty-driven learning persisted after controlling
for age differences in working memory, arguing against this
potential interpretation.
Another possibility is that older adults fail to represent
sufﬁcient levels of uncertainty because they have an aversion to
uncertainty or the mental effort required to represent it.
In descriptive lottery tasks younger and older adults are
similarly averse to uncertainty about probabilities associated
with possible gains suggesting that this explanation is unlikely
to play a major role42. More generally, it is possible that
older subjects are more averse to the expenditure of mental
effort required to maintain an accurate uncertainty estimate and
instead rely on a simpler learning strategy43. From our
computational model it is not clear why representing low
levels of uncertainty would be any easier than representing
any other ﬁxed level of uncertainty: the computational costs
within our model are associated with updating, rather than
maintaining, uncertainty estimates. One potential source of
cognitive costs could be in the representation of the task model
itself. There is some evidence that older adults tend to rely less on
model-based strategies for learning44. In contrast, they tend to
rely more on external cues to guide behaviour, which, in our task,
could correspond to adopting a strategy like the ‘win-stay
lose-shift’ heuristic commonly used by older adults in choice
tasks45,46. This general idea corresponds well to the double
dissociation noted in our descriptive analysis of learning
behaviour: Older subjects are more responsive to environmental
learning cues (surprise) but much less responsive to internally
generated ones (uncertainty).
The crucial factor limiting uncertainty representations in older
adults could, and at some level must be, biological in nature. One
candidate for such a limiting factor is norepinephrine, a
neuromodulator thought to track uncertainty in changing
environments17. There is some evidence that low-level arousal
systems including brainstem noradrenergic nucleus locus
coeruleus (LC) are modulated by uncertainty and may mediate
its effects on learning. Pupil diameter, which is thought to reﬂect
LC activity, is modulated by uncertainty in both learning and
exploration tasks16,47,48. Activation of LC, and the corresponding
increase in cortical norepinephrine, increases the signal-to-noise
ratio in sensory neurons and may enhance learning by increasing
the gain of cortical units representing newly arriving
information17,49–51. A similar theory has already been proposed
to explain age-related differences in learning2,52. Whereas
previous accounts of the change in gain of information
processing across age have focused on dopamine depletion as a
possible explanation, there is also evidence that noradrenergic
signalling may be dampened across healthy aging53–55, providing
a potential link between our ﬁndings, the relationship between
arousal and uncertainty, and the decreased cortical gain theory of
aging.
Although it is tempting to link age-related changes in
representing uncertainty to reduction of a single neuro-
transmitter, several alternative biological accounts exist.
Functional imaging studies have highlighted uncertainty
representations in prefrontal areas including the anterior
prefrontal cortex (aPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)15,56–58.
There is substantial evidence for changes in the function and
structure of the prefrontal cortex across healthy aging59. For
example, prefrontal regions are substantially under-recruited in
older versus younger adults when learning higher-order task
structures60. Such under-recruitment could limit top-down
activation of a cortical learning network during uncertain
regimes15. Alternatively, diminished prefrontal recruitment
during uncertainty could contribute directly to muted
dopaminergic prediction error signalling, as prefrontal inputs
play critical roles in shaping these signals61.
The existence of supporting evidence for both prefrontal and
noradrenergic correlates of uncertainty representation highlights
the need for future work combining computational methods with
biological measurements and interventions that could unravel the
underlying causal relationships between these factors and
learning. Future studies should also investigate the extent to
which biomarkers for uncertainty interact with the magnitude of
reward-prediction error signals in the striatum. Taken in
the context of previous work, our ﬁndings suggest that
reward-prediction error signals in the striatum may be enhanced
by neuromodulatory (LC) or cortical (aPFC) uncertainty signals.
This would explain why prediction error signalling is diminished
in older adults only under conditions of uncertainty, as these are
the only conditions where reduced uncertainty representations
would come into play3,5–8,58. While this mechanism provides a
parsimonious explanation for previous ﬁndings, alternative
accounts involving uncertainty representations computed locally
in the striatum or the ventral tegmental areas are also plausible
and should be tested through age comparisons of uncertainty
modulations in the BOLD signal62,63.
Our results may also have implications beyond healthy aging
for the understanding of a number of mental disorders for which
learning deﬁcits are a hallmark. In some cases, such deﬁcits may
not reﬂect an inability to learn but rather speciﬁc deﬁcits in
computational processes that govern how much to learn from
new information. In addition to our results regarding aging, there
has been recent support for this idea with respect to the effects of
trait anxiety on learning64, but to date it is unknown whether
learning abnormalities in conditions such as attention deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism or schizophrenia are also
driven by higher-order computational factors. Our task and
modelling framework provide a means to address these issues65.
To summarize, in the current study we apply a normative
model of predictive inference to simulate possible effects of aging
on three factors that are thought to govern learning: uncertainty,
surprise and hazard rate. Using behavioural data and quantitative
model ﬁtting we show that learning deﬁcits in older adults are
best characterized by an underestimation of uncertainty rather
than a generic reduction of learning. This ﬁnding provides a
parsimonious mechanistic explanation for age-related
impairments in learning across a variety of tasks. Furthermore,
it highlights speciﬁc cortical and subcortical regions involved in
representing uncertainty as candidates for mediating age-related
learning deﬁcits. We hope that this work facilitates future studies
aiming to understand the neural underpinnings of limited
uncertainty representation and age-related changes thereof.
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms11609 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 7:11609 | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms11609 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 9
Methods
Participants. 59 younger and 63 older adults took part in the study. Target sample
size was pre-determined according to age effect sizes in previous studies of learning
and decision-making. Six older and two younger adults were excluded because of
insufﬁcient data (o300 trials of predictive inference task completed). Thus, the
effective sample consisted of 57 younger adults (mean age: 24.5 years, age range:
20–30 years, 29 female) and 57 older adults (mean age: 69.2 years, age range: 56–80
years, 26 female). Participants gave written informed consent. The Institutional
Review Board of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development approved the
study. In addition to the experimental task, participants completed a biographical
and a personality questionnaire and several psychometric tests: (1) Identical
pictures test; (2) Raven’s Progressive matrices66; (3), Spot-a-Word test; and (4) the
Operations span task (OSPAN)67. As shown in Table 1 older adults had lower
scores on the Identical pictures test, Raven’s matrices and the OSPAN task than
younger adults (P valueso0.001, ZG2 s40.21). In contrast, older adults obtained
higher scores than younger adults on the Spot-a-Word test (Po0.001, ZG2 ¼ 0.20).
Consistent with previous ﬁndings from larger population-based samples, these
results suggest age-related reductions in ﬂuid intelligence and age-related
improvements in crystallized intelligence68.
Procedure. Participants performed two sessions, which were separated by a
minimum of 1 week and a maximum of 3 weeks. In the ﬁrst session, participants
completed a biographical questionnaire, the BIS/BAS personality questionnaire,
Raven’s progressive matrices66 as well as a two-state Markov decision task69,
data of which are presented in ref. 44. In the second session, participants performed
the predictive inference (Helicopter) task15, the OSPAN task, the Spot-a-
Word and the Identical pictures test as well as a version of the two-state
Markov task.
Predictive inference task. Participants completed two blocks (200 trials each) of a
computerized predictive inference task programmed in Matlab (The MathWorks,
Natick, MA) using MGL (http://justingardner.net/mgl) and snowDots
(http://code.google.com/p/snow-dots) extensions. The predictive inference task
required inferring the mean of a noisy variable that underwent occasional change
points15. The problem was embedded in a cover story involving a virtual helicopter
(mean) that moved occasionally (change points) and dropped a bag from the sky
on each trial (noisy variable).
On each trial the participant moved a bucket to the most likely position of the
helicopter using a keyboard (Fig. 1a). After the bucket position was conﬁrmed
through a key press, the participant observed a bag fall from the top of the screen
followed by an explosion that revealed the contents of the bag (200 gold coins or
silver rocks; randomized across trials) and the extent to which those contents were
collected in the bucket (ranging from 0–200 depending on the distance between the
bucket and the bag). Gold tokens (but not rocks) collected in the bucket were
translated into incentive payments at the end of the task. The horizontal position of
the bag was denoted with a grey tick mark on the screen and the distance between
the bag and bucket (prediction error) denoted by a red line. These markings served
to eliminate working memory requirements and allowed subjects access to all
relevant information in choosing how much to adjust the bucket position for
the subsequent trial.
The horizontal position of each bag (represented on a numerical scale from
0 to 300 for convenience) was drawn from a normal distribution with a mean
corresponding to the position of a virtual helicopter hovering in the sky and a s.d.
that was manipulated blockwise (10 or 25; counterbalanced for order). On most
trials the helicopter would remain stationary, but on a small fraction of trials
(ground truth hazard rate; 1/10) it would relocate to a new screen position. On the
vast majority of trials the helicopter was ‘hidden’ by clouds. Occasionally, the
helicopter was revealed visually (catch trials; 1/10). In principle, the visible
helicopter could provide perfect information about the mean of the distribution,
but in practice the centre of the helicopter was not obvious due to asymmetry in the
cartoon helicopter image and the vertical distance between this image and that of
the bucket (Supplementary Fig. 1). Participants were instructed to infer the location
of the helicopter based on previous observations (bag and helicopter positions) and
to place the bucket directly underneath it.
Training. Before completing two blocks of the predictive inference task
participants went through a series of training tasks that slowly built the complex
task from simpler elements. As in the experimental session, every training task
consisted of a low and high standard deviation (noise) block (counterbalanced for
order). In the ﬁrst training task the helicopter was completely visible and thus
bag locations were not necessary to guide behaviour. To ensure that participants
understood that the helicopter is the best outcome predictor we used a response
criterion that required participants to put their bucket ten times exactly underneath
the visible helicopter. Each noise block stopped after either the criterion was
reached or after a maximum of 80 trials. In the second training task with two
50-trial runs clouds covered the helicopter and occasionally disappeared during
catch trials. This version of the task was the same as the experimental task
except that participants would not earn money for their collected coins. Overall
performance, in terms of coins collected, did not differ across age groups
(Supplementary Fig. 2).
Computational modelling. To dissociate surprise-driven updating from
uncertainty-driven updating we extended an existing normative model for learning
in a dynamic environment that has been described in detail previously15,16,18. In
brief, this model approximates optimal inference by tracking two factors that
should drive learning: change-point probability (the probability with which a
change in the helicopter location occurs) and uncertainty (the reliability with which
an outcome reﬂects the true location of the helicopter). Here we extend this model
in four ways. First, we develop a new method for estimating change-point
probability and uncertainty that captures subjective differences in experienced
surprise. Second, we extend the generative framework and corresponding inference
equations of the model to incorporate catch trials. Third, we extend the normative
model to allow for speciﬁc deviations from normativity including surprise
insensitivity, incorrect hazard rate assumptions, and uncertainty underestimation.
Finally, we extend the model to consider more complex models of behaviour that
allow for subjective differences in the representation of noise.
The ﬁrst extension of the previously described computational methods allowed
for subjective estimates change-point probability and uncertainty. Previous studies
have run the normative model over trial outcomes to get trial-by-trial estimates of
these quantities16; however, one issue with this approach is that since participant
and model predictions do not always perfectly match, an outcome that constitutes a
small and unsurprising error for the model might actually be a large and rather
surprising one for the participant. To avoid this potential problem we obtained
subjective measures of change-point probability and uncertainty by running
the normative model across the prediction errors experienced by participants,
rather than the outcomes that generated them. Model variables were computed
recursively by ﬁrst determining the uncertainty about the current helicopter
location according to the relative uncertainty, change-point probability and
prediction error from the previous trial:
s2m ¼ Ots2N þ 1Otð Þs2Ntt þOt 1Otð Þdtð1 ttÞ ð1Þ
Where s2m is the variance on the predictive distribution over possible helicopter
locations, s2N is the variance on the distribution over bag locations (noise), Ot is the
probability of a change point on the previous trial (that is, the probability with
which the helicopter has relocated between trials), tt is the relative uncertainty
from the previous trial and dt is the prediction error from the previous trial.
Relative uncertainty was computed by expressing uncertainty about the helicopter





Where ttþ 1 is the relative uncertainty for trial tþ 1. This relative uncertainty
estimate, along with the variance on the bag distribution (noise; s2N ) was used to
calibrate the change-point probability associated with each new prediction error:
Otþ 1 ¼ H=300





Where H is the hazard of a change point (0.1) and dtþ 1 is the new prediction error.
Subjective estimates of change point probability and relative uncertainty were
computed by evaluating equations 1 and 2 according to the trial-by-trial prediction
errors made by each individual subject.
The second extension of the model was necessary to account for additional
information provided on catch trials in which the helicopter is visible to
participants. To maintain the deterministic nature of the model but also account
for perceptual ambiguity associated with the helicopter image we treat the visible
helicopter as a cue indicating a Gaussian likelihood function centred on the ground
truth (mean of the bag distribution). We allow the variance of the Gaussian to be
adjusted to account for behaviours ranging from completely trusting the helicopter
information to completely ignoring it. Combining this additional cue with the
information provided by the bag itself led to the following additional equations that
Table 1 | Psychometric proﬁles of younger and older adults.
Psychometric
Younger adults (N¼57,
mean age: 24.5, range:
20–30)
Older adults (N¼57,
mean age: 69.1, range:
56–80)
measure (mean, s.e.m.) (mean, s.e.m.)
Raven
(raw score)
12.3 (0.4) 6.3 (0.4)
Ospan total
score
54.3 (1.7) 39.9 (2.2)
Processing
speed
31.1 (0.6) 21.2 (0.5)
Spot-a-Word 19.9 (0.8) 25.7 (0.7)
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were implemented at the end of each helicopter visible trial to update position
estimates:





Where Bt is the belief of the model about the true mean of the distribution and wt
reﬂects the weight of the current belief in a weighted mixture of the current belief
and the true mean (m) as indicated by the helicopter. wt is determined according to
the relative variances on the current predictive (sm) and helicopter centred
likelihood distributions (sH).
In addition, the following equations were implemented to reduce the relative






Where s2 is the variance on the predictive distribution over possible helicopter











Where s2m and s
2
H are the variances associated with the internal prediction and the
perceptual information provided by the visible helicopter, respectively.
The third extension of the normative model served to allow for speciﬁc deviations
from optimal behaviour. We simulated behaviour from four versions of the
normative model: (1) a version using the update equations described previously15,16
with the modiﬁcations described above, (2) a model with diminished sensitivity to
surprise created by raising the change point likelihood to a power between 0 and 1
(0.2 for ﬁgures) as described previously18, (3) a low hazard rate model expecting
change points to be rare (H was set to 0.001) and (4) an uncertainty underestimation
model in which uncertainty was reduced after each observed bag drop by dividing
the estimated variance on the predictive distribution over possible helicopter
locations (s2m) by a constant on each trial (10 for simulations).
Flexible versions of the normative model were ﬁt directly to behaviour and used
to infer maximum likelihood estimates of (1) hazard rate, (2) surprise sensitivity
and (3) uncertainty underestimation, which were then use to identify age-related
differences in these computational factors. For the purposes of model ﬁtting,
participant updates were deﬁned to be sampled from a normal distribution with a
mean equal to the model predicted update and a s.d. that was a linear function of
the absolute prediction error magnitude. The intercept and slope of this linear
function were ﬁt as free parameters and can be thought of as variability in the
motor update and learning rate selection processes respectively. Thus, the
minimally complex model contained ﬁve free parameters, three of which were
related to learning and two of which were related to response variability. This
model ﬁt better than several more constrained ones in which parameters were ﬁxed
to their normative values (Supplementary Fig. 4).
In addition, more complex models were constructed that considered potential
sources of variability related to the perception of noise. These complex models
included all of the basic variables as well as one or more of the following free
parameters: (1) a multiplicative scaling term to allow for scaled perceptions of
noise, (2) an additive offset term allowing for subjective biases in overall
levels of noise perception and (3) a noise variability term allowing for individual
subjects to represent a distribution across possible noise values. Since there were
only two noise conditions, including additive and multiplicative scale factors
amounted to allowing the noise for each block type to be ﬁt as a free parameter.
Within the model that accounted for noise variability, the likelihood of observations
was not drawn from a single normal distribution (as described in equation 3), but
instead from a weighted mixture of normal distributions, where each component of
the mixture had a mean of zero and a s.d. equal to a scaled version of the total
uncertainty. Scale values were represented as uniformly spaced points on a grid
(ranged 0.1–100) with associated probabilities drawn from an inverse gamma
distribution. The shape term of the gamma distribution was ﬁt as a free
parameter and can be thought of as conveying the amount of evidence for the
expected noise distribution, with lower values indicating more uncertainty over
possible noise values.
All models were ﬁt using a constrained search algorithm (fmincon in
Matlab) that maximized the total log posterior probability of participant updates
given participant prediction errors and parameter estimates. Weak priors favouring
normative learning parameters were used to regularize parameter estimates.
Uncertainty underestimation estimates were positively skewed and thus reported
and analysed in log units. All model-ﬁtting code will be made available on
request.
Data analysis. Participant bucket placements and trial outcomes were used to
compute trial-by-trial prediction errors (d):
dt ¼ wt Bt ð8Þ
where wt and Bt are the locations of the dropped bag and placed bucket on trial t,
respectively. The corresponding updates made by the participant in response to
each prediction error were computed as:
Updatet ¼ Btþ 1 Bt ð9Þ
The ﬁrst and last trials of each block were omitted from further analysis,
as updates on these trials were likely to be inﬂuenced by block changes. Trials
where the prediction error equalled zero were also omitted, as they provide no
information about error-driven learning. In addition trials where bucket placement
fell more than 15 screen units away from any possible delta rule update towards the
previous bag or helicopter position were omitted, as they were considered to be
governed by a process other than error-driven learning. 1.1% of trials were
removed in this way.
Trial-by-trial updates were analysed with a regression model that included trial-
by-trial prediction errors to account for overall learning rate, as well as the
interaction of prediction error with ﬁve mean-centred factors: (1) surprise (change-
point probability as computed above), (2) uncertainty (relative uncertainty as
computed above), (3) noise (s.d. of bag distribution), (4) trial value (gold versus
rocks) and (5) helicopter visibility (binary variable describing whether helicopter cue
was provided). To allow for updates towards the visible helicopter on catch trials, the
model also included the interaction between the true mean of the distribution and
the helicopter visibility variable. An additional nuisance term was also included to
account for a slight bias in bucket placements towards the centre of the screen. One
potential shortcoming of this regression model is that the residuals are
heteroscedastic; speciﬁcally, absolute residuals are larger on trials where participants
made larger absolute prediction errors. To account for this, we used an initialization
regression for each participant and pooled the residuals to compute the variance over
residuals across sliding windows of absolute prediction error magnitude. These
variance estimates were used to weight the errors in a weighted regression equation
that also included a ridge penalty to regularize coefﬁcient estimates:
b ¼ ATPAþRTR  ATPUpdate  ð10Þ
where A is the explanatory matrix, P is the inverse variance matrix, and R is a
regularization matrix constructed with the ridge parameter equal to 0.1.
To identify speciﬁc learning differences predicted from the normative model
(Fig. 2), we applied the penalized weighted regression model to data that were
binned in sliding windows according to the size of the absolute prediction error
made by the participant divided by standard deviation of the bag distribution,
which served as a proxy for surprise (Fig. 3a). Each bin contained 10% of the total
data and successive bins had lower and upper bounds that were incremented by a
single percentile resulting in 90 total bins.
Regression coefﬁcients were smoothed across bins and t-tests were used to
identify ‘clusters’ of contiguous bins for which the p-value was smaller than 0.05.
This procedure was repeated for three separate tests to reject the null hypotheses
that (1) coefﬁcients from older participants are different than zero, (2) coefﬁcients
from younger participants are different from zero and (3) coefﬁcients from
younger participants are different from those from the older participants. For each
cluster, we computed cluster mass as the size of the cluster (number of bins) times
the average absolute t-statistic within that cluster. For each test statistic a null
distribution over cluster mass was generated by creating 10,000 permutations of the
data (using sign-ﬂipping for single group tests and label-ﬂipping for the group
comparison). Cluster corrected permutation tests were conducted by comparing
the observed cluster mass for each test statistic against the null distribution created
through these permutations. See Supplementary Fig. 3 for estimates of parameters
that did not differ across the age groups.
Single participant coefﬁcients were extracted for each coefﬁcient that was
signiﬁcantly different across age groups according to a leave-one-subject-out (LOSO)
procedure: Coefﬁcients for each participant were extracted from the error bin that
corresponded to the maximum absolute t-statistic from a between groups t-test
across all bins for all other participants. These LOSO coefﬁcient estimates were
included as explanatory variables in a regression on participant age. Speciﬁcally, we
created four distinct explanatory models containing: (1) only
an intercept term, (2) LOSO coefﬁcients and an intercept, (3) LOSO coefﬁcients,
Raven’s scores, OSPAN scores and an intercept. Nested F-tests were used to compare
the ﬁts of these different models while accounting for differences in complexity.
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